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INTEGRATED PHYSICALITY AND 
THE ABSENCE OF GOD: SPIRITUAL 




Why do some people effortlessly experience God and others do not, no matter how much they may desire to? In the 
Christian tradition, there are different answers to this question. Some have seen this as a result of the Fall, election, or as 
Sarah Coakley argues, the result of God’s ‘dark intimacy’. Could the fact that human experiences turn out to be, at least 
partly, within our own control help us choose among these theories of the hiddenness of God, or even pose an alternative 
account? Human experience and belief are embodied and as such are conditioned by intentional practices: for example, 
in daily prayer, liturgy, ritual, and charismatic activities. Research in cognitive science of religion and neurobiology 
suggests that the brain is essentially malleable, constantly changing in response to lived experience. This article argues 
for the possibility of using scientifically- informed tools to work with psychological and neurobiological realities to 
provide a deeper understanding of the cooperative, participatory nature of our embodied human engagement with Divine 
presence and absence.
1. Introduction
‘Ask, and it will be given to you; seek, and you will find; knock, and it will be opened to you.’ 
With these words, Matthew 7:7 offers an explicit suggestion of what so many Christians unques-
tioningly assume to be true: that for those who so desire and choose, a life of faith and relation-
ship with God is theirs for the taking. And yet, it remains a puzzling and problematic reality that 
there are those who wish to experience belief in God, but do not— no matter how much they may 
so desire. These are the individuals who would echo the anguished words of John Wesley, prior 
to his encounter with God at Aldersgate: ‘I want that faith which no one can have without know-
ing that he hath it.’1 This is not so much a problem of intellectual assent to the plausibility of 
theological propositions (though many have treated the problem as such), but rather a deeply felt 
lack of experiential knowledge of God. This experiential deficit poses serious problems for those 
who view religious belief as a volitional choice, as well as for those who understand belief to be 
1 John Wesley, ‘The Journal of the Reverend John Wesley’, in The Works of the Reverend John Wesley (London: John 
Mason, 1829), 77.
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an unchosen gift or theological brute fact. In contemporary theology and philosophy of religion, 
this issue has become known as the ‘problem of divine hiddenness’, drawing both a variety of 
theological defences of God’s apparent absence in particular lives and minds, and also strident 
arguments highlighting the potential implications of divine hiddenness for the plausibility of 
God’s very existence.
What is lacking, however, is a full appreciation of contemporary science’s substantial contri-
butions to debates about divine hiddenness. In recent years, a growing body of research has made 
it increasingly clear that thoughts, beliefs, and perceptions are not so far removed from human 
agency as is often assumed. At the same time, it seems equally true that what one believes (about 
God or any other aspect of reality) is not amenable to direct volitional choice. Rather, all human 
beliefs and experiences are embodied and, crucially, seemingly amenable to indirect influence, 
alteration, and development. Even when beliefs do not seem to be chosen or under individual 
control, it is yet the case that they are constantly being reinforced, encouraged, or discouraged in-
directly through repetition, focused attention, communal context, ritual, and emotionally salient 
experiences. In short, what one believes to be true about God is not so much a matter of cogni-
tive assent to theological propositions, but rather an experiential perception of reality. Further, if 
religious belief is neither a matter of disembodied reason and direct choice, nor simply a brute 
cognitive fact divorced from all human behaviour, context, and experience, then individual par-
ticipation in the belief- formation process becomes a real biopsychosocial possibility. In what 
follows, I will argue that the embodied and flexible nature of all human experience and cogni-
tion renders one’s religious beliefs to be at least amenable to indirect influence, alteration, and 
development via the appropriate use of ‘spiritual technologies’: habits, practices, and curated 
experiences that holistically affect one’s openness to and experience of spiritual realities. This 
scientific reality offers invaluable resources to debates about divine hiddenness. Specifically, 
theologians are not limited to the development of elaborate defences about why God would 
choose not to make Godself known to individuals receptive to such knowledge. Rather, theolo-
gians are both scientifically and theologically warranted in exploring embodied methodologies 
of hope, pairing neurobiological research on belief formation with theological content.
As with all instances of science- engaged theology, however, scientific research can never be 
the whole theological story. Embracing the neurobiological and psychological sciences is both 
necessary and advantageous for theologians interested in belief formation, but there must be a 
theological framework justifying and guiding such integration. Science alone cannot do the theo-
logical ‘heavy lifting’ in regards to the problem of divine hiddenness, and an affirmation of 
human agency in one’s religious beliefs requires a theological foundation that includes theolog-
ical anthropology and an account of the God- nature relationship. To that end, the following ar-
gument assumes 1) a theological affirmation of the human person that embraces what can be 
called ‘integrated physicality’— a nonreductionist affirmation of the human person that recog-
nises the theological value of physicality itself, and 2) an expansive depiction of the God- nature 
relationship that positively affirms divine involvement with the physical world at all times and 
places, such that the natural, physical processes involved in belief formation need not be seen as 
theologically threatening, but as instances of creaturely participation in and with a God whose 
relational involvement with the created world defies strict binaries between the ‘spiritual’ and the 
physical.2 James K. A. Smith expresses this well, writing that ‘nature, in a sense, is “suspended” 
in the Spirit of creation; or we might say that creation is “charged” with the Spirit’s presence. 
2 Theologically, there are various ways to argue for such a depiction of the God- nature relationship. For analyses of 
Thomistic, panentheistic, and pneumatological perspectives, see Sarah Lane Ritchie, Divine Action and the Human Mind 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
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Nature, then, is always more than “the natural”.’3 When one assumes that divine involvement 
with the created world is an ever- present reality, and that the integrated, nonreductionist physical 
nature of the human person is thus inherently involved with God in the first place, then the use 
of spiritual technologies as redemptive methodologies of hope is revealed to be very much a part 
of Christian theology and tradition.4
In sum, my argument here is that not only do the brain- related sciences offer invaluable in-
sight into the embodied nature of belief formation (and hence the problem of divine hiddenness), 
but also that human agency in belief formation can be theologically affirmed (given a non- 
dualistic theological anthropology and a properly integrated model of the God- nature relation-
ship). Indeed, this discussion is not only useful in addressing the more technical puzzles of belief 
formation; it may well be the case that this sustained exploration of the embodied nature of belief 
formation— of embodied, experiential knowledge of God— indicates suggestive possibilities for 
how one should think about normative theology more broadly. My goal is not to offer a definitive 
argument for a specific theological anthropology, or to offer a conclusive defence for a particular 
articulation of divine interaction with physical processes. Instead, this discussion is intended to 
be suggestive, exploring the sorts of theological possibilities that arise when the embodied nature 
of belief formation is taken seriously, and applied specifically to the particular problem of divine 
hiddenness. Such scientific engagement thus reaches ‘downward’ to the methodological and 
even practical specificities of agent- directed belief formation, and ‘upward’ toward suggestive 
discussions about the nature of the relationship between the divine nature, human desire and 
embodied agency, and physical processes in the natural world.
2. The Problem of Divine Hiddenness
While contemporary debates about the problem of divine hiddenness are usually highly technical 
and conducted using the methods of analytic philosophy, the phenomenological reality at issue 
is anything but a recent development. In its most basic and existential form, the problem of di-
vine hiddenness can be described as an individual or communal lack of experiential knowledge 
of divine existence, presence, and/or relationship, and particularly within those who experience 
themselves as receptive to such experiential knowledge. Note the emphasis here on experiential 
knowledge: the hiddenness problem is not so much a matter of intellectual assent to basic doctri-
nal commitments or the basic claim that God exists. Nor is it meant to address the existence and 
experience of committed atheists who consider themselves fundamentally unreceptive to divine 
existence and communication. Rather, the hiddenness problem refers specifically to the experi-
ence of those who understand themselves to be receptive to and even desirous of relationship 
with God: ‘God is hidden, if not in fact at least in their experience’.5 Moreover, hiddenness de-
bates tend to focus mostly (or even exclusively) on the relational God of Judeo- Christian mono-
theism, namely because these traditions’ conception of God prioritises the distinctively loving, 
relational, revelatory nature of the divine being. As Howard- Snyder and Moser summarise, 
‘Jewish and Christian theists believe that their flourishing as persons depends on their being in a 
personal and social relationship with God. For many such theists, however, there is no such 
3 James K. A. Smith, Thinking in Tongues: Pentecostal Contributions to Christian Philosophy (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2010), 40.
4 For a sustained discussion of the Christian tradition’s historical affirmation of human embodiment and divine in-
volvement with natural, physical processes, see Michael C. Rea, The Hiddenness of God (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2018).
5 Daniel Howard- Snyder and Paul K. Moser, ‘Introduction: The Hiddenness of God’, in Divine Hiddenness: New 
Essays, eds. Daniel Howard- Snyder and Paul K. Moser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1- 23, at 2.
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discernible relationship.’6 This phenomenological fact, it is then argued, should be taken as theo-
logically and philosophically significant.
Within contemporary philosophy of religion and analytic theology, the phenomenological 
puzzle of experiential divine absence has been developed into various technical discussions 
about its possible bearing on the plausibility of God’s very existence. This more philosophical 
debate is not so much focused on the existential experience of God’s absence contextualised 
within the life of faith; this divine absence is often known as a ‘dark night of the soul’, poignantly 
described by Mother Teresa when she writes, ‘Lord, my God, who am I that You should forsake 
me? … I call, I cling, I want— and there is no One to answer. . . . What are You doing My God to 
one so small?’7 Rather, the contemporary discussion has emphasised cognitive belief states and 
the experience of those who are not able to affirm that God does, indeed, exist. As we will see 
below, these two modes of divine hiddenness are far less distinct, cognitively and neurobiologi-
cally, than has been assumed by the mainstream conversation. In any case, the contemporary 
discussion has largely been shaped by the work of J.L. Shellenberg, who argues that the obvious 
existence of non- resistant nonbelievers is positive evidence against the reality of the all- loving 
and personal God inherent to Judeo- Christian theism.8 As Howard- Snyder and Moser summarise 
the argument of Schellenberg’s seminal 1993 book Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, ‘If 
there were a perfectly loving God, He would see to it that each person capable of a personal re-
lationship with Him reasonably believes that He exists, unless a person culpably lacks such be-
lief. But there are capable, inculpable nonbelievers. Therefore, there is no perfectly loving God.’9 
Naturally, the debate about divine hiddenness has evolved rapidly and extensively since the pub-
lication of Schellenberg’s 1993 book, with both theologians and philosophers analysing, critiqu-
ing, expanding, and defending various components of Schellenberg’s argument, the contemporary 
version of which has been aptly summarised by Adam Green and Eleonore Stump: 
1. If God exists, then God is perfectly loving, desiring loving relationship with all created 
persons.
2. If God is perfectly loving, then God would ensure that all persons can participate in relation-
ship with God unless they have excluded themselves through some kind of resistance.
3. There are nonresistant nonbelievers.
4. Therefore, God does not exist.10
Unsurprisingly, the hiddenness argument against God’s existence has drawn intense scrutiny 
and raised pertinent questions of clarification about nearly every word and concept in the argument: 
Who determines how divine love is manifest, and is a lack of experience of that love indicative that 
it is not operative? Similarly, is the status of a relationship with God determined by an individual’s 
perception of that relationship? What does it mean for a nonbeliever to be non- resistant, and how 
can that non- resistance be identified and evaluated? What does it mean to be a believer or a nonbe-
liever— is it necessary to be in a cognitive state of belief in order to be in a relationship with God? 
6 Ibid., 1- 2.
7 Mother Teresa, Come Be My Light: The Private Writings of the Saint of Calcutta, ed. Brian Kolodiejchuk (New 
York: Doubleday, 2007), 186- 87.
8 John L. Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).
9 Howard- Snyder and Moser, Introduction, 4. The conversation around divine hiddenness has seen significant evolu-
tion since the publication of Schellenberg’s 1993 book, including Schellenberg’s own shift from language of ‘culpability’ 
in non- belief to conversations about resistance and non- resistance in unbelief. See John L. Schellenberg, The Hiddenness 
Argument: Philosophy’s New Challenge to Belief in God (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
10 Adam Green and Eleonore Stump, Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief: New Perspectives (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), 1.
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While each of these questions has been rigorously examined in arguments defending and critiquing 
Schellenberg’s core argument, it is most relevant for this article simply to highlight the general con-
tours of common theological defenses against the argument from divine hiddenness.
Michael Murray and David Taylor suggest three general theological strategies for countering 
the argument from divine hiddenness.11 First, one might question whether there really are incul-
pable or nonresistant nonbelievers. William Wainwright, for example, describes Jonathan 
Edwards’ view that there is, indeed, sufficient evidence for any individual to believe in God, if 
that individual is so disposed: ‘Evidence sufficient to bring about a belief in God’s existence and 
goodness in everyone capable of such belief and not disposed to resist it is available’.12 Second, 
a great many theologians respond to the hiddenness problem by describing various known goods 
that might result from the experience of divine hiddenness. For example, Michael Murray has 
argued that human free will requires a degree of divine hiddenness if an individual is to choose 
to love and worship God of her own accord. Murray writes that ‘if God does not remain "hidden" 
to a certain extent, at least some of the free creatures He creates would be in the condition of 
being compelled in the context of a threat and, as a result, such creatures could not exercise their 
freedom in this robust, morally significant manner’.13 Sarah Coakley, on the other hand, engages 
with John of the Cross to argue that ‘what appears to be divine "hiding" is actually a unique form 
of divine self- disclosure for the purposes of redemption; but the recognition of this redemptive 
undertaking involves a transformative process of human response that is both subtle and enor-
mously demanding’.14 Coakley thus agrees with Schellenberg on the existence of nonresistant 
nonbelief, but takes such a state as a profound invitation to journey deeper into the ‘dark inti-
macy’ recognized in various ways by so many leading lights within the Christian tradition. 
Finally, one might respond to Schellenberg that there may well be unknown goods resulting from 
the experience of divine hiddenness. This last approach bears strong resemblance to the skeptical 
theism response to the problem of evil; indeed, many manifestations of the hiddenness debate are 
remarkably similar to parallel debates regarding the problem of evil.
My intention here is not to adjudicate between Schellenberg and the various responses to the 
problem of divine hiddenness. What is noteworthy, at this stage, is the way in which both 
Schellenberg and his critics often view religious belief or nonbelief as a static cognitive state 
beyond one’s direct or indirect control. Indeed, it is striking to note the intricacies with which 
such arguments are elaborated, describing precise and complex reasons why an individual might 
not believe in God, and/or why God would choose not to make God’s presence known to all who 
would be open to such a relationship. There is, I suggest, a place for such arguments. Nevertheless, 
what remains underexplored is a scientifically- informed theological appraisal of divine hidden-
ness that does not take one’s current sense of belief as a permanent cognitive trait, but instead 
takes seriously the reality that humans have significant influence in what they experience, per-
ceive, and even believe. I am not the first to suggest this theological possibility. For example, 
while Coakley sees the experience of divine absence as a necessary part of spiritual maturation 
and redemption, she does not see such nonbelief as a permanent state; rather, ‘there is a clear, 
practiced pathway for responding to the apparent crisis of “hiddenness’’’, one which involves a 
11 Michael J. Murray and David E. Taylor, ‘Hiddenness’, in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion, 
second edition, eds. Chad Meister and Paul Copan (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 368- 77.
12 William Wright, ‘Jonathan Edwards and the Hiddenness of God’, in Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, eds. Daniel 
Howard- Snyder and Paul K. Moser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 98- 119, at 98.
13 Michael Murray, ‘Coercion and the Hiddenness of God’, American Philosophical Quarterly 30, no. 1 (January 
1993), 27– 38, at 29.
14 Sarah Coakley, ‘Divine Hiddenness or Dark Intimacy? How John of the Cross Dissolves a Contemporary 
Philosophical Dilemma’, in Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief: New Perspectives, eds. Adam Green and Eleonore 
Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 230.
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contemplative practice.15 More to the point of this article, Michael Rea has recently developed a 
sustained and science- engaged argument that ‘experiential access to God’s presence is more 
widely available than many suppose it to be, more similar even to the most dramatic biblical 
experiences of God than many suppose it to be, and more similar to our ordinary experiences of 
other human persons than many suppose it to be’.16 This claim finds significant interdisciplinary 
support in the sciences, and has largely to do with the fact that belief itself is both natural and 
embodied.
3. Religious Belief: Natural and Embodied
What, exactly, is religious belief? For that matter, what does it mean to believe in anything? 
Epistemologists, philosophers, and theologians will offer varying responses to these questions, 
but neuroscientist Andrew Newberg offers a simple definition that is particularly useful in this 
interdisciplinary context: ‘A belief can be defined as any perception, cognition, or emotion that 
the brain assumes, consciously or unconsciously, to be true’.17 Scientifically, to believe some-
thing is simply to experience that ‘something’ as true, as indicative of what is simply the case 
about reality. There are philosophical correlates to Newberg’s definition; William Alston, for 
example, summarizes that ‘if S believes that p, then if someone asks S whether p, S will tend to 
respond affirmatively’.18 It is striking just how far this description of belief is from Mark Twain’s 
witty maxim that ‘faith is believing what you know ain’t so’: scientifically, an individual is not 
in a state of belief if the individual in question knows something ‘ain’t so’.19 William James de-
scribes this nicely, writing that doctrine alone is not enough to engender belief ‘out of whole 
cloth when our perception actively assures us of its opposite’.20 In short, to believe something is 
not to affirm a proposition that one knows or suspects not to be true, but to experience that 
‘something’ as real. One’s beliefs can certainly be incorrect and fail to correspond to reality, but 
that correspondence has little to do with the individual’s experience of that reality (at least prior 
to experiences that would challenge the belief in question).
Similarly, beliefs in general seem to be the product of natural, evolved cognitive responses to 
our environments— and are thus wholly embodied. Indeed, the ability to form beliefs about one’s 
environment is both fundamental and vital for the survival of many species, particularly humans. 
In an evolutionary context, beliefs can be seen as heuristic tools contributing to the ability to 
respond quickly and efficiently to agents and events in one’s surroundings. As such, beliefs (and 
the development of beliefs) can never be fully understood apart from a deep knowledge and 
appreciation of the physical, bodily, and cognitive mechanisms involved. Yes, the relative corre-
spondence of such beliefs to reality can be analyzed using diverse tools and methods that seem 
to have little to do with human embodiment; but any effort to understand the human ability to be-
lieve— or the processes involved in belief formation— will be insufficient if the relevant physical 
and cognitive processes are ignored. One striking implication of the embodied nature of belief 
15 Coakley, ‘Divine Hiddenness’, 240.
16 Rea, The Hiddenness of God, 11.
17 Andrew Newberg and Mark Robert Waldman, Born to Believe: God, Science, and the Origin of Ordinary and 
Extraordinary Beliefs (New York: Free Press, 2007), 21.
18 William P. Alston, ‘Belief, Acceptance, and Religious Faith’, in Faith, Freedom, and Rationality, eds. Jeff Jordan 
and Daniel Howard- Snyder (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 4; slightly altered for readability, as cited in 
Daniel Howard- Snyder.
19 Mark Twain, The Pudd’nhead Maxims: Pudd’nhead Wilson’s New Calendar (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1911).
20 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (New York: Modern Library, 
1994), 167.
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is that it becomes untenable to treat beliefs as propositional abstractions to be simply chosen or 
decided upon after rational deliberation. Of course, reason and deliberation are important tools in 
the evaluation of beliefs, but are indirect and relatively inefficient means by which to encourage, 
alter, or discourage particular beliefs— within oneself or in others.
How, then, should the human ability to form beliefs be scientifically understood in the context 
of specifically religious belief? Religious belief is, of course, not something to be reduced to the 
empirical explanations on offer. Belief is multimodal, contextualised, social, embodied, and a 
complex product of culture, community, linguistic realities, and narrative frameworks. That 
being said, useful and persuasive explanations of belief formation are offered by cognitive sci-
ence of religion on one hand, and neuroscientific research on ‘exceptional experiences’ on the 
other. What seems clear from these dual research pathways is that belief in general, and religious 
belief in particular, is natural (even intuitive21), embodied, and a product of both normal cogni-
tive mechanisms and relatively more intense or immersive embodied experiences.
3.1. Cognitive Science of Religion
Researchers within cognitive science of religion (CSR) employ research and methods from a 
variety of psychological and evolutionary fields to examine, describe, and explain religious 
thought, belief, experience, and practice.22 While scholars naturally disagree on particular expla-
nations for and approaches to religious belief and behaviour, there is consensus that specifically 
religious belief is a product of normal cognitive mechanisms that have developed within a natu-
ral and explicable evolutionary context. Put differently, one might say that religious belief comes 
easily and naturally to humans precisely because of the sorts of minds and bodies we have; our 
cognitive architecture is such that the development of religious belief is both predictable and 
normal.23 CSR as a whole prioritises explanations for religious belief that emphasize the normal, 
everyday, even mundane nature of religious belief. CSR does not emphasise or privilege dra-
matic religious experiences or exceptional moments of transcendence (contrary to neuroscien-
tific approaches discussed below). As with all beliefs, specifically religious beliefs are to be 
understood as normal cognitive products of holistic engagement with and interpretation of one’s 
environment.
The classic conceptual distinction within CSR is between the adaptation and byproduct ap-
proaches. Those opting for an adaptation approach to religious belief seek to understand how 
religious beliefs might have evolved due to their adaptive value within both individual lives and 
larger communities.24 For example, the moral injunctions and divine omniscience often attend-
ing religious beliefs might lead to prosocial behaviour that positively affects the survival and 
flourishing of the community as a whole. Other researchers point to the existence of ‘costly 
signalling’, seemingly disadvantageous religious behaviours that indicate authentic commitment 
21 Deborah Kelemen, ‘Are Children “Intuitive Theists?” Reasoning about Purpose and Design in Nature’, 
Psychological Science 15 (2004): 295– 301.
22 This article accepts the legitimacy and value of CSR as an important scientific field, but it is worth noting that the 
field itself is not without its critics. For example, insofar as CSR involves hypotheses that are difficult to test and theories 
that are difficult to falsify, some claim that the field relies on ‘just so stories’ and is thus not properly scientific. See, for 
example, Gabriel Levy, ‘The Prospects and Pitfalls in “Just- So” Storytelling in Evolutionary Accounts of Religion’, 
Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, 25 (2013): 451- 59. For a rebuttal of common critiques to CSR methodology, 
see Emma Cohen, Jonathan A. Lanman, Harvey Whitehouse, and Robert McCauley, ‘Common Criticisms of the 
Cognitive Science of Religion— Answered’, CSSR: Bulletin 37 (2008): 112- 15.
23 Robert McCauley, Why Religion is Natural and Science is Not (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 197.
24 See, for example: Candace Alcorta and Richard Sosis, ‘Ritual, Emotion, and Sacred Symbols: The Evolution of 
Religion as an Adaptive Complex’, Human Nature 16 (2005): 323- 59.
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to the group, thereby promoting trust and social cohesion— which, in turn, may contribute to 
group survival and fitness.25
By far the dominant approach in CSR, however, is the ‘byproduct’ or ‘spandrel’ approach. 
Leading CSR scholar Justin Barrett, for example, argues that specifically religious beliefs are 
byproducts of the human cognitive ability to form beliefs about our environments more gener-
ally.26 In this approach, there is no need to posit adaptive advantages of religious beliefs; it is 
enough to describe how religious beliefs utilise the same cognitive mechanisms which our minds 
have evolved to navigate our surroundings more broadly. One classical example of the byproduct 
approach involves what Justin Barrett has termed the ‘hypersensitive agency detective device’ 
(HADD): this concept describes the cognitive predisposition to ascribe agency and intention to 
objects or events in our surroundings, whether or not those objects or events are, indeed, indica-
tive of an intentional agent. This might be colloquially described as the ‘better safe than sorry’ 
approach. I am far more likely to survive if I over- attribute agency to noises in the forest than if 
I under- attribute agency. For Barrett, it is conceivable that this normal HADD is at least partially 
responsible for encouraging belief in superhuman or supernatural agents like spirits and gods.27
In addition to the adaptation and byproduct approaches, some CSR scholars prefer the ‘dual 
inheritance’ approach, which recognizes religious beliefs as byproducts of cognitive mecha-
nisms involved in belief formation more broadly, while still affirming that the resulting religious 
beliefs acquired prosocial adaptive value.28 Religious beliefs may have originated as unexpected 
byproducts of normal cognitive functioning, but within cultural contexts may well have taken on 
adaptive lives of their own, so to speak.29 Regardless of the many approaches and debates within 
CSR, the established core of the field’s literature suggests that religious belief is a natural and 
normal aspect of human cognition that has evolved because of the minds, bodies, and environ-
ments that humans have. The lingering question, of course, is whether the naturalness of reli-
gious belief has anything to say about the actual existence of a divine being. Critics of religion 
routinely consider scientific explanations of religious belief and behaviour to be a defeater of 
such belief’s epistemological validity; God is ‘in fact a psychological illusion, a sort of evolved 
blemish etched onto the core cognitive substrate of your brain’.30 Other CSR researchers are 
often more measured in their evaluations. If a creator God exists and desires relationship with 
human beings, would we not expect that humans would naturally have the cognitive mechanisms 
required for such a relationship? Justin Barrett, for example, argues that cognitive science can be 
paired with philosophical and epistemological frameworks in such a way that natural religious 
belief is taken to be, in some sense, trustworthy or indicative of reality: ‘Cognitive science (par-
ticularly, CSR) plus a particular epistemology justifies holding natural religion as true until prob-
lems with these beliefs are demonstrated— and simply identifying a natural cause for them is 
25 Deborah L. Hall, Adam B. Cohen, Kaitlin K. Meyer, Allison H. Varley, and Gene A. Brewer, ‘Costly Signaling 
Increases Trust, Even Across Religious Affiliations’, Psychological Science 26, no. 9 (2015): 1368- 76.
26 Justin L. Barrett, Born Believers: The Science of Children’s Religious Belief (New York: Free Press, 2012).
27 Justin Barrett, ‘Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology’, in The Believing Primate: Scientific, Philosophical, 
and Theological Reflections on the Origin of Religion, eds. Jeffrey Schloss and Michael J. Murray (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 76- 99.
28 Scott Atran and Joseph Henrich, ‘The Evolution of Religion: How Cognitive By- Products, Adaptive Learning 
Heuristics, Ritual Displays, and Group Competition Generate Deep Commitments to Prosocial Religions’, Biological 
Theory 5 (2010): 18- 30.
29 And, indeed, provision for this possibility was made in Stephen Jay Gould’s own spandrel approach, taking the 
form of what Gould calls ‘exaptation’. See Stephen Jay Gould and Elisabeth S. Vrba, ‘Exaptation– A Missing Term in the 
Science of Form’, Paleobiology 8 (1982): 4- 15.
30 Jesse Bering, The Belief Instinct: The Psychology of Souls, Destiny, and the Meaning of Life (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2011), 37.
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insufficient’.31 It seems reasonable to conclude, then, that while scientific explanations for the 
evolution of religious belief depict it as wholly natural and embodied, such explanations need not 
be seen as theologically threatening.
3.2. Neuroscience and ‘Exceptional Experience’
CSR is not the only scientific field analysing religious belief and behaviour. While CSR re-
searchers prioritise the normal, everyday cognitive mechanisms involved in natural religious 
beliefs, other researchers in neuroscience and psychology explore the profound and lasting ef-
fects of more non- ordinary experiences, or what can be called ‘exceptional experiences’.32 Such 
experiences have often been called ‘religious experiences’, but this terminology is perhaps un-
helpful insofar as it suggests that exceptional experiences are always religious in nature (they are 
not) or that they always involve a mystical trance state (again, they do not).33 Speaking of ‘ex-
ceptional experiences’, on the other hand, emphasises the non- ordinary, immersive, and trans-
formative character of such experiences, without specifying exactly what form such experiences 
do, or should, take. Of course, it is very common for theologians and philosophers alike to 
downplay the role of exceptional experience, opting for a more ‘responsible’ or grounded, less 
emotive emphasis on doctrine, discipline, social justice, philosophical frameworks, etc. Indeed, 
speaking of emotion or religious experience can be felt as exceedingly disagreeable to modern 
sensibilities. My goal here is not to downplay the role of sound theology or reason— just the 
opposite— the goal is to offer a corrective: we are inherently embodied creatures, and robust 
theology and Christian practice are only enhanced by taking that embodiment seriously. And if, 
as neuroscience and psychology suggest, immersive, exceptional experiences are powerful, last-
ing factors in one’s felt sense of God’s reality and presence, then this aspect of embodiment 
needs to be fully appreciated.
Indeed, a science- engaged theological appreciation of relatively intense or non- ordinary expe-
riences of God will be vital for the sort of hopeful, agent- centred, active approach to the problem 
of divine hiddenness explored here. Michael Rea, for instance, has made just this point in his 
recent book The Hiddenness of God. Here, Rea suggests not only that ‘we might simply be 
wrong in thinking that God has somehow ceased communication and contact with substantial 
portions of humanity’, but also that such ‘communication and contact’, or ‘divine encounters’, 
are ‘and always have been, experientially available to a much greater degree than is typically 
credited in the literature on divine hiddenness’.34 It is important to note that the exceptional ex-
periences at issue here exist on a very wide spectrum, ranging from a profound sense of divine 
love and presence while deep in contemplative prayer, to a euphoric sense of awe and peace in 
the midst of a deep forest under a starry night sky. Rea also emphasises the inclusivity of a broad 
range of experiences; while not discounting the caricatured mystical trance, he highlights the 
31 Justin Barrett, Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology: From Human Minds to Divine Minds (West 
Conshohocken, PA: Templeton Press, 2011), 156.
32 As with CSR, reliance on neuroscientific explorations into religious belief and experience can be criticized. Most 
significantly, one could argue that neuroscientific studies on religion tend toward reductionist explanations of religion, 
when they are really limited in methodology to explanations of neural correlates accompanying religion. Such critiques 
being duly noted, it is worth mentioning that neuroscientists themselves are often the first to recognize these 
limitations.
33 Of course, not all neuroscientists of religion focus on what I am calling ‘exceptional experiences’. I highlight such 
experiences here simply because they are notably undervalued in CSR and science- engaged theology. For an example of 
neuroscientific work that deliberately avoids a focus on exceptional experiences, see the research of Uffe Schjoedt. For 
example, see Uffe Schjoedt, ‘The Religious Brain: A General Introduction to the Experimental Neuroscience of Religion’, 
in Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 21 (2009): 310- 39.
34 Rea, The Hiddenness of God, 92.
10 Sarah Lane Ritchie
© 2021 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
‘more common, phenomenologically low- grade sorts of encounters like sensing the majesty of 
God while watching waves crash on a beach or hiking down into the Grand Canyon, feeling 
awash in the love of God while singing hymns around a campfire, or feeling forgiven by God in 
the wake of confessing one’s sins in prayer’.35 The relative intensity or dramatic nature of the 
experience is not nearly as important as the simple, sheer fact that one is experiencing the pres-
ence of God as a felt, salient reality. As William James presciently insisted, the key to under-
standing exceptional experiences is that they ‘seem to those who experience them to be also 
states of knowledge. . . . As a rule they carry with them a curious sense of authority’ even after 
the experience has passed.36 Such experiences will occur on spectra of varying emotional sa-
liences and intensities, but they share in common a felt sense that the experience is real.
Neurobiologically speaking, belief is not propositional, but primarily embodied and felt.37 The 
neural correlates of belief studied by neuroscientists indicate that religious belief is a whole- body 
experience; calling God a ‘belief’ is thus ‘a misnomer. . . . It is a perception. We believe what we 
perceive’.38 For example, researcher Nina Azari and her colleagues have used PET scans to 
demonstrate that religious practitioners reciting spiritual texts experience (neurally) the percep-
tion of a relationship with God or the Absolute.39 Regardless of whether or not a divine being 
exists, the participants were indeed experiencing God as a felt reality, and this experiential reality 
was empirically identifiable. It is significant that this study, and many others like it, involved 
people exhibiting relatively ‘normal’ behaviours (i.e. reciting Scripture), but also experiencing 
the presence and relationship of God in an extremely salient and holistic manner. Such experi-
ences may be considered barely exceptional, insofar as they involve nothing more than the rec-
itation of meaningful texts by religious practitioners, but they are extremely important for 
instantiating as real the associated doctrinal content.
Moreover, such relatively mild experiences exist on a spectrum with more intense experi-
ences, and these experiences also demand neuroscientific and theological attention. For exam-
ple, agnostic philosopher Paul Draper insists that a lack of experiential knowledge of God is 
exactly what is at issue in the seeming inability to believe in God; he writes, ‘I simply do not 
have vivid experiences of the sort that directly cause people to believe in God. Seeing is believ-
ing, but if God is real then I suffer from religious blindness or at least blurred religious vision’.40 
Draper’s poignant admission echoes James’ conviction: ‘I doubt if dispassionate intellectual 
contemplation of the universe . . . would ever have resulted in religious philosophies such as we 
now possess’.41 Experiential knowledge of God is crucial for the formation and retention of re-
ligious belief; such experience can be dramatic or fairly quiet in flavour. (And here it should be 
noted that direct, powerfully intense experiences of God are far more common than theologians 
often assume; Tanya Luhrmann’s When God Talks Back: Understanding the American 
Evangelical Relationship with God, for example, is one powerful anthropological analysis of the 
very real, and intensely powerful, transformative experiences that seem to accompany many 
35 Ibid., 92.
36 James, Varieties, 291.
37 Patrick McNamara, The Neuroscience of Religious Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 14.
38 Michael Graziano, God, Soul, Mind, Brain (Teaticket, MA: Leapfrog Press, 2010), 47.
39 Nina P. Azari, John Missimer and Rudiger J. Seitz, ‘Religious Experience and Emotion: Evidence for Distinctive 
Cognitive Neural Patterns’, The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion 15 (2005): 263– 81, at 274.
40 Paul Draper, ‘Seeking but not Believing: Confessions of a Practicing Agnostic’, in Divine Hiddenness: New 
Essays, eds. Daniel Howard- Snyder and Paul K. Moser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 197- 214, at 
197.
41 James, Varieties, 329.
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thriving religious communities.42) While exceptional experiences sometimes involve visions, a 
loss of bodily boundaries, or a sense of oneness with the universe, they can also be simpler— and 
perhaps more accessible— analogues of ‘normal’ experiences, such as feelings of joy, peace, 
wonder, love, and an overall sense of connection with God.43 The actual mechanisms for induc-
ing religious experience (intentionally or otherwise) involve such varied elements as rhythm, 
music, prayer, meditation, fasting, chanting, and psychedelics.44 Such exceptional experiences 
are experienced as moments of transcendence that provide the individual with a felt sense of 
connection (often emotional in flavour) to God.
4. Belief Formation and Human Agency in Theological Context
The question at hand, then, is apparent: if it is true that both normal cognitive mechanisms and 
more exceptional experiences contribute to a felt belief in— or a felt knowledge of— God, is there 
anything non- believing individuals can do to initiate, encourage, and develop that felt, experien-
tial sense of belief? Both theologically and scientifically, it seems that this is indeed a possibility 
worth taking seriously. Within the context of this discussion on divine hiddenness, the suggestion 
that non- believing individuals might be active participants in their own belief formation is, po-
tentially, an immensely freeing invitation. Moreover, such a suggestion is not without theological 
warrant. In keeping with the above scientific conjunction of CSR’s emphasis on normal cogni-
tive mechanisms and neuroscience’s prioritisation of more affective exceptional experiences, 
Michael Rea writes that ‘experiential access to God’s presence is more widely available than 
many suppose it to be, more similar even to the most dramatic biblical experiences of God than 
many suppose it to be, and more similar to our ordinary experiences of other human persons than 
many suppose it to be’.45 While many responses to the problem of divine hiddenness presuppose 
the static nature of religious belief and resort to theodical explanations for God’s intentional si-
lence or the individual’s Fall- based inability to believe, it is also possible that belief- inducing 
encounters with God are far more available than is usually supposed. This suggestion is theologi-
cally grounded in Christian tradition, particularly in the continued admonition to pursue spiritual 
disciplines as a means of participating more fully in the ever- active and ever- relational presence 
of God. As Rea notes, ‘the idea that experiencing the presence of God is a learnable skill is hardly 
new’.46 Indeed, what is ‘new’ is not the affirmation that one might cultivate a relationship with 
God by rigorously pursuing habits, communities, and experiences that are most likely to contrib-
ute to the development of such a felt belief, but rather the assumption that a felt sense of divine 
reality and relationship would be manifest without such active engagement with a lifestyle of 
faith- oriented behaviours and experiences.
The seventeenth- century theologian, mathematician, and overall polymath Blaise Pascal of-
fers a fascinating and pertinent example of not only the importance of an experientially rich 
belief in God, but also a striking description of just how deeply pragmatic the acquisition of such 
belief can be:
You would like to attain faith, and do not know the way; you would like to cure yourself of 
unbelief, and ask the remedy for it. Learn of those who have been bound like you, and who 
42 See Tanya Luhrmann, When God Talks Back: Understanding the American Evangelical Relationship with God 
(New York: Vintage Books, 2012).
43 Patrick McNamara, The Neuroscience of Religious Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 18.
44 Michael Winkelman, ‘Shamanism as the Original Neurotheology’, Zygon 39 (2004): 193– 217, at 195.
45 Rea, The Hiddenness of God, 11.
46 Ibid., 94.
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now stake all their possessions. These are people who know the way which you would fol-
low, and who are cured of an ill of which you would be cured. Follow the way by which 
they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc. 
Even this will naturally make you believe, and deaden your acuteness.47
As we will see, this injunction to ‘act as if’ one believed is remarkably prescient on Pascal’s part. 
He recognized that the seemingly mundane, normal, habitual actions associated with religious belief 
might contribute to the actualization of such belief in a previously non- believing individual who 
longed for a felt sense of such belief. However, it is equally important to remember that Pascal’s own 
religious belief had been transformed in what I have described above as an exceptional experience. 
Long after being intellectually converted to Christianity, Pascal had an intense religious experience 
that proved so pivotal to him that he had a record of it sewn into his coat, discovered by a servant 
only after his death. The record of this experience speaks to a decidedly non- ordinary encounter: 
‘FIRE. GOD of Abraham, GOD of Isaac, GOD of Jacob not of the philosophers and of the learned. 
Certitude. Certitude. Feeling. Joy. Peace . . .’48 What is perhaps most remarkable, then, is not that 
Pascal had presaged current neuroscientific research on habit- based cognitive change and belief 
formation, or that he had had a transformative religious encounter, but rather that he brought these 
realities together within his own psyche and thought. Perhaps more importantly, Pascal was not 
unique in this synthesis; ‘The medieval mystics held that the capacity to experience reliably and 
regularly the presence of God and communication from God is something that can be developed in 
a person with a great deal of practice and preparation. Many others in the Christian tradition both 
before and after them have held similar views’.49 In other words, the Christian tradition is rife with 
descriptions of the religious path that take for granted both a lifestyle of seemingly normal, routine 
religious practices and behaviours, and occasional encounters with God that are felt as being rela-
tively more exceptional and transcendent in flavour. Far from existing in opposition, the mundane 
and the exceptional exist in dynamic relationship.
5. Brain Plasticity and Belief Formation
If, then, we can agree theologically with Michael Rea that ‘there is indeed learnable skill in-
volved in coming to experience God’,50 two questions remain: 1) Do the various brain sciences 
suggest that beliefs can indeed be indirectly chosen via such ‘learnable skills’? And, 2) What 
sorts of experiences and skills are most conducive to the development of an experiential religious 
belief?
The consensus in contemporary neuroscience is that whatever the relationship between spiri-
tual realities and the material world, any felt experience of God is at least mediated through the 
brain.51 Moreover, there is a strong link between qualitatively rich exceptional experiences of 
God on one hand, and religious habit, practices, and communal experiences on the other. 
Religious behaviours and practices impact the brain, and altered neural pathways in turn affect 
how one experiences reality. This reciprocal relationship is described by researchers studying 
brain plasticity, or neuroplasticity. The term ‘neuroplasticity’ describes the brain’s ability to alter 
47 Blaise Pascal, Pensées of Blaise Pascal, trans. W.F. Trotter (London: Dent, 1932), sec. III, n. 233.
48 Blaise Pascal, Oeuvres complètes (Paris: Seuil, 1960), 618.
49 Rea, The Hiddenness of God, 94.
50 Ibid., 98.
51 Eugene d’ Aquili and Andrew Newberg, The Mystical Mind: Probing the Biology of Religious Experience 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1998), 16.
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its function and even structure in response to experience, both mental and physical. As particular 
experiences cause adjacent neurons to be consistently activated simultaneously over time, the 
neural connections between them strengthen in service of neural efficiency. Colloquially, one 
can say that ‘neurons that fire together, wire together’.52 The implication of such microscopic 
neural change is not only that lived experience changes the brain, but also that the functionally 
altered brain will then have an effect on future lived experience.53 Plasticity research thus high-
lights not only the importance of the brain for what humans experience, but also the agency that 
humans have in directing their own experiences of the world. That is, ‘neuroplasticity research 
marks a considerable shift in focus from reductionist, locationalist views to more holistic, or 
system- oriented, perspectives on the body- brain- environment nexus’.54 Or as Joel Green de-
scribes it, this constant ’‘‘becoming" is encoded in our brains by means of synaptic activity as 
both nature and nurture yield the same effect— namely, sculpting the brain (and thus shaping the 
mind) in ways that form and reform the developing self’.55
Note that brain plasticity is essentially the neurobiological description of learning.56 Few 
would be surprised to learn that intensive musical training changes brain functioning, or that 
being a taxi cab driver significantly alters the actual structure of the brain devoted to spatial ori-
entation.57 What is perhaps more surprising is the realisation that such neural change is always 
occurring, and that one can play an active role in the immensely complex, holistic processes in-
volved. The brain is constantly changing in highly specific ways; this is normal, intrinsic, and 
occurs regardless of human intention or awareness.58 However, it is also true that these neurobi-
ological learning processes are not only amenable to self- direction, but also affect how our future 
selves experience and respond to the world.
This reality becomes immensely significant in the context of religious belief and experience. 
To the extent that religious belief is both a normal aspect of evolved cognitive functioning and 
heavily influenced by more salient, embodied, exceptional experiences, then religious ‘knowl-
edge’ should be susceptible to the same sorts of neurobiological microprocesses involved in all 
learning. As Ian Barbour has written, just as ‘we use the skills of "knowing how" rather than the 
propositions of "knowing that’’’ to learn to ride bicycles, so is religious belief inculcated ‘through 
interaction with our physical environments and other people’.59 And indeed, it seems that the 
natural mechanisms of brain plasticity and subsequent cognitive change have long been utilized 
(unwittingly or not) by religious communities around the world. In other words, religious tradi-
tions have long been encouraging spiritual disciplines and experiences that are particularly likely 
to aid in the ‘learning’ of belief. Abstract reasoning alone is unlikely to give rise to a felt sense of 
52 This saying is attributed to Carla Shatz at Stanford University. See Norman Doidge, The Brain That Changes Itself 
(New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 427.
53 William Long, ‘Quantum Theory and Neuroplasticity: Implications for Social Theory’, Journal of Theoretical and 
Philosophical Psychology 26 (2006): 78- 94.
54 Florence Chiew, ‘Neuroplasticity as an Ecology of Mind: A Conversation with Gregory Bateson and Catherine 
Malabou’, Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (2012): 32– 54, at 34.
55 Joel B. Green, Conversion in Luke- Acts: Divine Action, Human Cognition, and the People of God (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Baker Academic, 2008), 85.
56 Eric Kandel, ‘The Molecular Biology of Memory Storage: A Dialogue between Genes and Synapses’, in Nobel 
Lectures, Physiology or Medicine, 1996- 2000, ed. H. Jornvall (Singapore: World Scientific, 2003).
57 Eleanor Maguire and others, ‘Navigation- Related Structural Change in the Hippocampi of Taxi Drivers’, 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 97 (2000): 4398– 4403.
58 Alvaro Pascual- Leone, Amir Amedi, Felipe Fregni, and Lofti B. Merabet, ‘The Plastic Human Brain Cortex’, 
Annual Review of Neuroscience 28 (2005): 377- 401.
59 Ian G. Barbour, ‘Neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence, and Human Nature: Theological and Philosophical 
Reflections’, Zygon 34 (1999): 361– 98, at 375.
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religious beliefs, for without holistic, embodied engagement with religious practices, ‘religious 
beliefs lack both emotional salience and motivational force’.60
Supposing, for the moment, that one recognizes the importance and possibility of curating 
one’s own behaviors, practices, communities, and experiences toward the end of a felt sense or 
‘knowledge’ of God, how might such holistic knowledge be pursued? While plasticity research-
ers examine a range of relevant factors contributing to long- term cognitive and affective change, 
three particularly important elements are focused attention, repetition, and emotional salience.61 
When one selects and curates spiritual technologies that prioritise these factors, they are far more 
likely to be effective in contributing to a lasting sense of God’s reality and presence.
5.1. Focused Attention
One of the most important factors in whether a practice or experience leads to long- term neuro-
biological and cognitive change is focused attention. When the human mind is intentionally fo-
cused on a particular object or task, that object or task is far more likely to be incorporated into 
the subject’s future cognition and perception. For example, researcher Mike Merzenich con-
ducted an experiment with monkeys wherein the animals had their fingers tapped for one hun-
dred minutes a day for six weeks. At the same time as their fingers were being tapped, sounds 
were played over headphones on the monkeys’ ears. The animals were taught to pay attention to 
one or the other stimulus by being rewarded with sips of juice. Notably, the monkeys who learned 
to pay attention to the finger tapping exhibited a two- to three- fold increase in the amount of 
cortical area devoted to finger motion.62 The other monkeys, who experienced the exact same 
stimuli but paid attention to the music, did not exhibit this neural change. More to the point here 
is the work of neuropsychiatrist Jeffrey Schwartz, whose experimental work with obsessive- 
compulsive disorder (OCD) patients has demonstrated the cognitive and neural effects of chang-
ing the focus of one’s attention. Schwartz used mindfulness- based cognitive- behavior therapy to 
teach patients how to pay attention to their thoughts and emotions, observing and making note of 
them with focused attention. Subsequent PET scans demonstrated that the mental act of paying 
attention to their obsessional thoughts dramatically decreased activity in the orbital frontal cor-
tex (essential to the OCD neural circuits), also changing the patients’ actual cognitions.63
When it comes to religious belief and behavior, focused attention is particularly important. If 
it is indeed the case that religious behavior and experience can change cognition and beliefs, we 
would expect attention areas of the brain (namely the frontal lobes64) to be particularly involved 
in many such behaviors and experience. This is indeed what current research indicates: for ex-
ample, religious meditators and pray- ers demonstrate enhanced activity in brain regions associ-
ated with focused attention, and these regions are also associated with the processing of beliefs, 
memory, and language.65 Perhaps even more striking, such religiously- focused attention is cor-
60 Alcorta and Sosis, ‘Ritual, Emotion, and Sacred Symbols’, 323– 59, at 344.
61 Aniruddh Patel, ‘Why Would Musical Training Benefit the Neural Encoding of Speech? The OPERA Hypothesis’, 
in The Relationship Between Music and Language, ed. Lutz Jäncke (Zurich: Frontiers Research Foundation, 2012).
62 Sharon Begley, Train Your Mind, Change Your Brain (New York: Random House, 2007), 159.
63 Jeffrey M. Schwartz, Paula W. Stoessel, Lewis R. Baxter, Jr., et al., ‘Systematic Changes in Cerebral Glucose 
Metabolic Rate after Successful Behavior Modification Treatment of Obsessive- Compulsive Disorder’, Archives of 
General Psychiatry 53, no. 2 (February 1996): 109– 13.
64 Michael Posner and Steven Peterson, ‘The Attention System of the Human Brain’, Washington University 
Department of Neurology TR- 89- 1 (1989).
65 Osamu Muramoto, ‘The Role of the Medial Prefrontal Cortex in Human Religious Activity’, Medical Hypotheses 
62 (2004): 479– 85.
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related with changes in brain structure itself; long- term meditators exhibit thicker prefrontal re-
gions of the brain than control groups.66
In short, religious and spiritual activity involving sustained focused attention leads to signif-
icant and lasting changes in the brain and cognitive experience. What is notably striking, but 
perhaps not surprising, is just how many religious practices already prioritise prayer, liturgy, 
worship, contemplation, and meditation— all activities that call for an individual’s attention to 
be directed toward the object of worship and relationship.
5.2. Ritual and Repetition
A second and related determinative factor in long- term neurobiological and cognitive change is 
repetition— or, in the context of worshipping communities, religious ritual. Neural changes are 
positively correlated with increased use of particular behaviors over time. This is perhaps self- 
evident; it seems common sense that the neurological changes accompanying learned skills like 
playing an instrument, performing an athletic action, or navigating city streets would increase 
over time and with practice.67 Indeed, as individuals consistently choose particular actions, the 
brain forms new connections that strengthen, quite literally, into the path of least resistance for 
synaptic firing. In this way, actions that initially required volitional effort eventually become 
automatized. This automaticity is incredibly important for the long- term alteration of behaviors 
and beliefs. One key to changing thoughts and behaviors seems to be effectively managing the 
volitional effort that is available to automatise desired thoughts and behaviors slowly over time. 
In order to effectively alter beliefs and experiences, then, these desired alterations need to be-
come embodied through habit and repetition.68
It should be no surprise that religious rituals are immensely powerful agents of cognitive and 
affective change within individuals and communities. This is phenomenologically true, of 
course, but current scientific research also supports the claim that religious ritual can strengthen 
and even generate belief over time.69 Religious rituals often involve immersive elements such as 
rhythm, music, movement, aesthetic alterations (e.g. incense and lighting), and are formally 
contextualized within a worshipping community.70 Even seemingly ‘normal’ rituals, which so 
many religious participants experience on a weekly basis, can ‘synchronize affective, perceptual- 
cognitive, and motor processes within the central nervous system of individual participants’.71 
Within a particular religious context, rituals serve to unite doctrinal commitments and theologi-
cal concepts with the embodied, affective experience of the individual; rituals turn doctrine into 
‘felt experiences, into mind- body, sensory, and cognitive events that "prove" their reality’ to 
those involved.72
66 Sara W. Lazar, Catherine E. Kerr, Rachel H. Wasserman, et al., ‘Meditation Experience Is Associated with 
Increased Cortical Thickness’, Neuroreport 16, no. 17 (November 2005): 1893- 97.
67 Edward Jones, ‘Cortical and Subcortical Contributions to Activity- Dependent Plasticity in Primate Somatosensory 
Cortex’, Annual Review of Neuroscience, 23 (2000): 1– 37.
68 Clare Carlisle, ‘The Question of Habit in Theology and Philosophy: From Hexis to Plasticity’, Body & Society 19 
(2013): 30– 57, at 44.
69 Richard Sosis, ‘Why Aren’t We All Hutterites? Costly Signaling Theory and Religious Behavior’, Human Nature 
14 (2003): 91– 127.
70 Eugene d’Aquili and Charles Laughlin, ‘The Biopsychological Determinants of Religious Ritual Behavior’, Zygon 
10 (1975): 37.
71 Eugene d’Aquili and Charles Laughlin, ‘Biopsychological Determinants’, 38. Also see Udo Will and Gabe Turow, 
‘Introduction to Entrainment and Cognitive Ethnomusicology’, in Music, Science, and the Rhythmic Brain, eds. Jonathan 
Berger and Gabe Turow (New York: Routledge, 2011).
72 Andrew Newberg, Eugene d’Aquili, and Vince Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away: Brain Science and the Biology of 
Belief (New York: Ballantine Books, 2001), 91.
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5.3. Emotional Salience
Finally, emotion can be an immensely powerful factor in long- term alteration of cognition, per-
ception, and experience. Emotional salience seems to lead to greater neural change than repeti-
tive behaviors lacking a meaningful sense of emotional engagement.73 For example, presented 
with two stories of comparable length and facts but differing in levels of emotionally- charged 
content, an individual will remember far more factual details from the emotion- laden story.74 The 
importance of emotional engagement for learning may even seem self- evident; humans learn 
quickly to avoid situations and behaviors associated with negative emotion and to gravitate to-
ward those associated with positive emotion.75 It is (partially) in this way that habits are formed. 
In fact, it seems that many of the structural brain changes involved in addiction (neuroplasticity’s 
dark side) are linked to the neurochemical rewards (felt as positive emotions) induced by the 
drug.76 Positive emotional states are significant facilitators of neurobiological change, triggering 
lasting changes in its structure and function that in turn alter perceptions and cognitions.77 
Though emotional engagement may seem entirely subjective and un- testable, the importance of 
emotional engagement for brain change is entirely falsifiable. One can imagine that a child 
forced to spend hours practicing piano music that she loathed might not exhibit as much neural 
change, if for no other reason than that the neurochemical reward systems (i.e. positive feelings) 
were not motivating her to keep practicing. In other words, emotion itself might not directly 
change neural structures (although it might, particularly in highly intense or traumatic situa-
tions78), but it does seem to provide the motivating reward that keeps people engaging in repeti-
tive behaviors— which, over time, change the neural functions and structures of the brain.
As discussed above, the role of emotion in religious belief is perhaps most obvious within the 
context of exceptional experiences; the more emotionally salient one’s religiously contextualized 
experiences, the stronger one’s felt sense of religious belief.79 Research into religious experi-
ence80 has focused on various aspects ranging from altered states of consciousness, the correla-
tion of a ‘felt’ presence of God with electrical activity in the frontal and temporal lobes of the 
brain, and using brain scans to identify both the cognitive and emotional substrates of religious 
experience.81 What is clear is that such experiences need not be dramatic in order to be experi-
entially and cognitively significant; even seemingly subtle or normal emotions can be power-
fully transformative tools within the right context. Even institutionally sanctioned, normal 
religious rituals can serve to produce ‘conditioned association of evoked emotions with specific 
73 James McGaugh, ‘Significance and Remembrance: The Role of Neuromodulatory Systems’, Psychological 
Science 1 (January 1990): 15– 25.
74 Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (Orlando, 
FL: Harvest, 1999), 294.
75 Natasa Jokic- Begic, ‘Cognitive- Behavioral Therapy and Neuroscience: Towards Closer Integration’, Psychological 
Topics 19 (2010): 235– 254, at 239.
76 National Institute on Drug Abuse, ‘Section II: The Reward Pathway and Addiction’, in The Neurobiology of Drug 
Addiction (2007), <http://www.druga buse.gov/publi catio ns/teach ing- packe ts/neuro biolo gy- drug- addic tion/secti on- ii- 
rewar d- pathw ay- addic tion>.
77 For a review of such changes, see Eric Garland and Matthew Owen Howard, ‘Neuroplasticity, Psychosocial 
Genomics, and the Biopsychosocial Paradigm in the 21st Century’, Health & Social Work 34, no. 3 (August 2009): 
191– 99.
78 Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1996), 257.
79 McNamara, Neuroscience of Religious Experience, 16.
80 Uffe Schjoedt, ‘The Religious Brain: A General Introduction to the Experimental Neuroscience of Religion’, 
Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, 21 (2009): 310– 339, at 312. Schjoedt’s article provides a detailed review of 
current research.
81 Jensine Andresen and Robert Forman, ‘Methodological Pluralism in the Study of Religion’, Journal of 
Consciousness Studies 7 (2000): 7– 14, at 13.
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cognitive schema’.82 While the role of emotion in philosophical or theological discourse about 
religious belief is almost always minimized or dismissed altogether, neurobiological insights 
suggest that such disregard is at odds with the way the human person most naturally forms and 
sustains belief. Exceptional experiences are both natural and important to the development and 
sustaining of belief, and are also within experiential reach of many or most people. As Rea notes, 
‘people who have the relevant measurable traits and who cultivate the right kinds of spiritual 
habits will be more likely to have religious experiences of various kinds’.83
6. Faith and/or Belief
This article has argued that one under- explored approach to the human experience of divine hid-
denness involves a recognition of the wholly embodied, experiential, affective nature of belief. 
While humans have evolved in such a way that we are cognitively disposed to naturally form 
religious beliefs, this cognitive predisposition alone is not enough to create the sort of richly 
textured experiential knowledge of God that is so important for a life of faith. Nor is rational 
deliberation alone effective in creating a felt sense of God’s existence and presence. Nevertheless, 
when the content of belief is paired with habits, practices, and experiences that prioritise focused 
attention, repetition, and emotional salience, it becomes far more likely that the belief one seeks 
may, indeed, become a felt reality. As William James notes, ‘Truth happens to an idea. It be-
comes true, is made true by events’.84
But the question must arise: Is this not a defense of brainwashing or manipulation? Does 
this argument not presuppose a willingness to be fooled or tricked into believing things that are 
unlikely to be true? Such spiritual technologies as those described above could well be put to 
dangerous use, after all.
In answer to this, it is first necessary to remember that humans exist in a state of constant 
change. Our brains, cognition, and experience are being altered on a daily basis, whether or not 
we are aware of it. Every time an individual goes to a film, attends a concert, falls in love, sheds 
tears after a favourite sports team loses a championship game— she exposes herself to experi-
ences and contexts that will shape her holistic experience of reality in one way or another. We are 
always exposing ourselves to so- called ‘manipulation’. Recognising this, it then becomes a ques-
tion of how, precisely, we will allow ourselves to be changed. We may not be able to directly 
choose to believe in God or to experience the existence of God as a felt reality, but an individual 
can choose to put herself in a position where such belief becomes more likely. And this, I reiter-
ate, is a theologically justified position, if one adopts what James K. A. Smith calls a ‘dynamic, 
participatory ontology [that] refuses the static ontologies that presume the autonomy of nature’.85 
If one adopts the historical theological affirmation that all nature, all physical processes, are in-
herently involved with the creative and relational presence of God, and affirms ‘material creation 
as "charged" with the presence of the Spirit’, (including a ‘nondualistic affirmation of embodi-
ment and materiality’), then cooperating with that divine presence via the careful use of forma-
tive spiritual technologies is wholly appropriate.86
82 Alcorta and Sosis, ‘Ritual, Emotion, and Sacred Symbols’, 341.
83 Rea, The Hiddenness of God, 134.
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Press, 1907), 97.
85 James K. A. Smith, ‘Is the Universe Open for Surprise?’, Zygon 43 (2008): 879- 96, at 890.
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7. Conclusion
In closing, it is helpful to acknowledge a distinction between faith and belief. It is possible that 
one might pursue behaviors, practices, and experiences as acts of faith, even when one lacks 
cognitive belief. Jonathan Kvanvig, for example, defines faith in the following way:
[Faith] is an orientation of a person toward a longer- term goal, an orientation or disposition 
toward the retaining of the goal or plan or project in the face of difficulties in achieving it, 
one prompted by affections of various sorts and involving complex mental states that are 
fundamentally affective even if they involve cognitive dimensions as well. A plan, purpose, 
or goal is developed, and the culmination of this process involves a commitment by the 
individual to such a plan, and in following through on such a commitment the person dis-
plays the kind of faith that I am describing.87
Here, faith is more of a holistic disposition and orientation than cognitive assent that something 
is or is not true. Daniel Howard- Snyder is also helpful here, further emphasizing that, ‘being in doubt 
is no impediment to faith. Doubt is not faith’s enemy; rather, the enemies of faith are misevaluation, 
indifference or hostility, and faintheartedness’.88 A mere lack of belief need not necessarily entail a 
lack of faith. It is entirely possible that one might be compelled— for any number of reasons— to 
pursue a relationship with God, even if she currently experiences nothing but the hiddenness of God. 
To act in faith without the accompanying state of belief is not to pretend that something is true, but 
to act as if something is true, in faith that such a holistic cooperation with God might well result in 
the sort of active, robust knowledge of God that one seeks.
As intellectually and experientially difficult as the experience of divine hiddenness may be, 
mere acceptance and justification of such hiddenness may not be the appropriate theological re-
sponse. Those who wish to embody a felt religious belief are both scientifically and theologically 
warranted in working with the biological processes involved in exceptional experience and belief 
formation, in cooperation with pre- existent evolved cognitive dispositions and mechanisms that 
make belief thoroughly natural, thereby altering one’s neurobiology and enhancing the organis-
mic responsiveness necessary for a felt sense of belief. Such a suggestion is both hopeful and lies 
well within the bounds of Christian theology; as Rea contends, ‘there is consensus that the ca-
pacity to experience God can be developed through regular prayer, serious devotion to the culti-
vation of moral and spiritual virtue, and the development of various habits of mind that might 
reasonably be described as seeking the presence of God, listening for God’s voice, reaching out 
to God in love, and the like’.89 What is remarkable here is how extraordinarily apt and scientifi-
cally grounded such traditional advice is turning out to be.
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